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COMMENT
INDIAN LAW: THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE
AND COLONIAS DE SANTA FE
Some 5,400 acres of land belonging to the Tesuque Pueblo sit on
the edge of Santa Fe, awaiting the bulldozers, the building crews and
the residents of a modern housing tract. If the machines and people
come, the state of New Mexico must only stand by and watch the
action, a spectator within its own territorial boundaries. This is the
consequence of the decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Sangre de Cristo Development v. City of Santa Fe and Board of
County Commissioners of Santa Fe, New Mexico.' The decision: the
city and county of Santa Fe may not exercise platting, planning or
subdivision control over the development of Colonias de Santa Fe
because the federal government has pre-empted such regulation.2
In brief, the holding is based on allegedly extensive and all-inclu-
sive federal regulation of subdivisions on Indian lands and federal
statutes relating to leasing of Indian lands. Taken together, the Court
reasoned, these statutes and regulations evidenced a congressional
intent to preclude the city and county from exercising platting,
planning or subdivision control over such developments as Colonias
de Santa Fe.3 The legal tag applied to this preclusion is the
pre-emption doctrine, established in respect to federal jurisidiction
over Indians, in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commissioner.4
This Comment challenges the Sangre de Cristo decision on three
grounds: first, the Secretary of Interior simply has not enacted
regulations for the development of subdivisions on Indian lands;
secondly, the intent of Congress is really the ultra vires law-making of
the Secretary of Interior; and thirdly, the pre-emption doctrine was
incorrectly applied to the Sangre de Cristo situation. The result of the
decision was to provide little protection for the future purchasers of
such land and their neighbors, and to leave the ultimate issues
unresolved and undiscussed. Carried to its logical conclusion, the
opinion, in applying the pre-emption doctrine as it did, could have
staggering consequences.
It is not difficult to understand the desire of Indians to make the
1. 11 N.M. State Bar Bulletin and Advance Opinions 382, __ N.M. - (1972). Cert.
denied, U.S. (1973). [hereinafter cited as 11 Advance Opinions .].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 380 US. 685 (1965).
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best economic use of their lands.5 Neither is it difficult to understand
their desire to remain free of state jurisdiction.6 But as Indian land is
turned to commercial uses, conflict with the state and local non-In-
dian citizenry almost inevitably follows. Consider, for example, the
fact that Indian lands comprise ten per cent of the total acreage in
New Mexico.7 Consider that Congress has expressly authorized
99-year leases for "public, religious, educational, recreational,
residential, or business purposes . . ." on the Navajo Reservation
and three other New Mexico pueblos-Cochiti, Pojoaque and Zuni.9
Consider, also, that such long-term leases of Indian lands have been
authorized by Congress in seven other states. 10 The Four Corners
Plant is located on land leased from the Navajo Indians. The Sandia
Pueblo purposes to build and lease a pari-mutuel dog and horse racing
facility, despite the fact that dog racing is illegal under New Mexico
law. Can Four Corners violate state air pollution laws with impunity?
Can the Sandia Pueblo violate state law? The answers are unknown.
The decision in Sangre de Cristo, however, provides a disturbing
precedent.
That decision need not be the final word on the subject. Currently
pending before the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico is a suit brought by the State of New Mexico against
Sangre de Cristo seeking a declaratory judgment that the state may
exercise jurisdiction over several facets of the Colonias de Santa Fe
development, including state subdivision controls." The decision of
5. There is some question whether the economic effect of state action is even a valid
consideration in determining the question of pre-emption. See, Agua Caliente Band of Mission
Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), in which the Ninth Circuit, while
recognizing that California's possessory interest tax could have an adverse economic effect upon
Indian lessors, nevertheless upheld the tax and Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, Governor of
Alaska, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), where, despite the fact the communities of Kake and Angoon were
totally dependent upon salmon fishing, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to enjoin threatened
enforcement against them of a state statute prohibiting the use of salmon traps.
6. Since Indian land generally is inalienable, freedom from state jurisdiction may be used to
offset the fact that land purchased on Indian land cannot be in fee simple absolute, but must be
merely a leasehold estate.
As to the validity of a state tax on such a leasehold interest see Agua Caliente Band of Mission
Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), and Muir, Ad Valorenm Tax Status
of a Private Lessee's Interest in Publicly Owned Property: Taxability of Possessory Interests in
Industrial Projects Under the New Mexico Industrial Revenue Bond Act, 3 N.M. L. Rev. 136
(1973).
7. 1971-72 New Mexico Blue Book 106. Of a total of 77,866,400 square miles in the state,
Indians own 7,313,600 square miles.
8. 25 U.S.C. §415.
9. Id.
10. Id. The other states in which such leases have been authorized are Florida, Arizona,
Utah, California, Colorado, Nevada and Washington.
11. David L. Norvell, Attorney General v. Sangre de Cristo Development Co., Inc. Civil
No. 9106 (filed 1971). Specifically the state seeks a declaratory judgment that Sangre de Cristo is
liable tinder the state gross receipts tax for tax on its receipts from sales of soft drinks made on
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the New Mexico Supreme Court bluntly makes the question one of
federal law.12 The United States District Court could well find that
pre-emption has not occurred.
The Colonias de Santa Fe controversy began in 1970 when Sangre
de Cristo Development Company, Inc., and the Tesuque Pueblo on
April 17, entered into a lease approved by the Albuquerque area
director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the United States
Department of Interior on May 24, 1970.13 Under the terms of the
agreement, the corporation was granted a 99-year lease on a
maximum of 5,400 acres of Tesuque land. 14 The land is located within
Santa Fe County and a substantial portion is within five miles of the
city limits of Santa Fe.15 Subsequently, the corporation in an action
against both the city and county of Santa Fe sought to enjoin the
defendants from exercising platting, planning and subdivision control
over its development, Colonias de Santa Fe. The defendants each
counter-claimed to enjoin the corporation from further violations of
state platting, planning and subdivision control laws.' 6 The Supreme
Court held that sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's action.17 Thus,
the leased land; that the company must obtain a dispenser's license issued by the state before
operating a bar selling alcoholic beverages on the leased land; that the construction on the
leased lands is subject to the provisions of the Construction Industries Licensing Act; that the
value of the leasehold interest and improvements thereon is subject to state ad valorem property
taxes; that the Land Subdivision Act is applicable to the development; and that state regulations
governing water quality and supply, sewage disposal and water pollution control are applicable
to the company.
The state property appraisal department estimated the value of the leasehold as of Jan. 1,
1971 at $1,855,500. At the 1970-71 tax rate, assessed valuation would be an estimated $618,900.
12. Conceivably the state supreme court's decision may have been made in light of the
pending federal action and the decision can be interpreted as, in effect, dumping the question of
state jurisdiction into the lap of the federal court. The denial of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court from the New Mexico decision makes the United States District Court action
even more significant. Of course, the United States Supreme Court might grant certiorarion the
federal court decision and ultimately settle the controversy.
13. 11 Advance Opinions at 384.
14. Lease between Sangre de Cristo Development Company, Inc., and the Pueblo of
Tesuque, No. 331,405, recorded in the County of Santa Fe in Book 279 at 585-645. The lease
provides for 1,300 acres initially, graduated to a maximum size of 5,400 acres.
15. 11 Advance Opinions at 384.
16. 11 Advance Opinions at 382. Specifically, the City of Santa Fe claimed violation of N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§14-18-1 to -12, §§14-19-1 to 14.1, §§14-20-1 to -24 (Repl. 1968) relating to municipal
platting, planning and subdivision authority, and the County of Santa Fe alleged violation of
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§70-3-1 to -9 (Supp. 1971), relating to county platting, planning and
subdivision control.
17. The court found that sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's suit against the city and
county because neither the state nor the city or county had "given permission or consent for this
suit against them... ."
Since there is no statute authorizing the plaintiff to sue defendants in the case
now before us, and since the functions which defendants claim they have the
authority to exercise over the land are governmental rather than corporate, it
appears clear from the New Mexico law, . . . that the trial court erred in
rejecting the defense of sovereign immunity asserted by each of the defendants.
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no injunction could issue against the city and county. 18 The Court
then declared that neither could an injunction issue against the
corporation because of the pre-emption doctrine.
The law governing state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands
has changed dramatically from the early decisions considering the
question. 19 Gradually, two tests have evolved to measure the validity
of state action in reference to Indians and Indian lands. The first was
established in Williams v. Lee.20 Under the Williams test, the relevant
inquiry is whether or not the power sought to be exercised will
interfere with the self-government of the Indian tribe.2' The other
test, established in Warren Trading Post, is whether the suggested
exercise of authority will "impair a right, granted, reserved or
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court found sovereign immunity dispositive of the case,
it felt constrained to decide the question of city and county jurisdiction over Colonias de Santa
Fe
because of its great public importance; because this issue was fully briefed and
argued by both sides on this appeal; and because defendants have expressly
urged... that we resolve this issue. (at 383).
The way the court applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity is, itself, open to challenge. In
general, the New Mexico decisions distinguish between sovereign immunity in terms of state
action and sovereign immunity involving actions by city and county governments. In the latter
situation, the Court, as late as two years ago, re-emphasized that a private person may move "to
enforce a public duty not due to the state." Womack v. Regents of the University of New
Mexico, 82 N.M. 460, 483 P.2d 934 (1971). Two of the judges on the bench in the Sangre de
Cristo action concurred in the Womack opinion. See also, Muir, supra note 6.
18. 11 Advance Opinions at 384. Two opinions in the case were handed down by the Court.
The first-No. 9441 (Sept. 22, 1972)-was written by Justice LaFel E. Oman. The second was per
curiam opinion. In both opinions, the court found that the disclaimer of right and title to Indian
lands in Art. XXI, 2 of the New Mexico Constitution did not preclude the applicability of state
laws to the current action since the disclaimer was of proprietary interest and not of
government control.
19. See, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), in which Chief Justice Marshall
declared the Cherokee Nation:
a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens
of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.
This altered status of Indians and Indian lands was discussed at length in both Sangre de
Cristo opinions. Particularly, the Court noted the widespread involvement of Indians in the
activities of the state.
20. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Williams involved a suit to collect a debt, brought
by a non-Indian operator of a general store on the Navajo Reservation in Arizona, against a
Navajo and his wife who lived on the reservation. The Court held that jurisdiction of the dispute
was in the tribal court and that the suit could not be brought in the state court.
21. This question was considered in the Sangre de Cristo case, 11 Advance Opinions at 385:
Since defendants seek to impose their claimed authority only over lands leased by
the Pueblo for 99 years to plaintiff, and only for the purpose of controlling the
platting, planning and subdivision activities of plaintiff, we are unable to see how
the exercise by defendants of this authority would interfere with the self-govern-
ment of the Tesuque Pueblo.
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pre-empted by Congress." 22 It is this concept-pre-emption 23-that
the New Mexico Supreme Court found determinative of the Sangre de
Cristo case. In short, the exercise of the city and county's subdivision,
planning and platting authority over the Colonias de Santa Fe
development on Tesuque lands "would conflict with the subdivision,
planning and platting authority which the United States has
pre-empted or reserved unto itself."2 4
The court found evidence of pre-emption in regulations 1.4 and
13125 of the Secretary of Interior and in the 1968 and 1970
amendments to 25 U.S.C. 415, the statute granting the secretary
general leasing authority. Reading the statutes and regulations
together, the court felt that:
it is obvious . . . Congress intended to and has accomplished, by
its enactments and the extensive and all-inclusive regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, a pre-emption by or a reservation
in the United States of all control over the leasing of Indian lands,
and this includes the subdivision, planning and platting of these
lands for the uses to be made thereof during the term of the
leasehold. 26
Ironically, probably the strongest ground for pre-emption-Regula-
tion 1.4 of the Secretary of Interior 2 7-was least emphasized by the
court.2 8 The section reads:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, none of
the laws, ordinances, codes, resolutions, rules or other regulations
of any State or political subdivision thereof limiting, zoning or
otherwise governing, regulating, or controlling the use or devel-
opment of any real or personal property, including water rights,
shall be applicable to any such property leased from or held or
used under agreement with and belonging to any Indian or Indian
tribe . ..
(b) The Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representa-
tive may in specific cases or in specific geographic areas adopt or
make applicable to Indian lands all or any part of such laws,
22. 11 Advance Opinions at 385.
23. For other examinations of the question of state jurisdiction relative to Indians see
Comment, State Power and the Indian Treaty Right to Fish, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 485 (1971); Note,
State Taxation on Indian Reservations, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 132 (1966); and Comment,
Indians-State jurisdiction over Real Estate Developments on Tribal Lands, 2 N.M. L. Rev. 81
(1972).
24. 11 Advance Opinions at 385.
25. 25 C.F.R. §§1.4 and 131 et seq. (1972).
26. 11 Advance Opinions at 386.
27. 25 C.F.R. §1.4. Regulation 1.4 was not even mentioned in the first opinion the Court
rendered in Sangre de Cristo.
28. 11 Advance Opinions at 386.
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ordinances, codes, resolutions, rules or other regulations referred
to in paragraph (a) of this section as he shall determine to be in the
best interest of the Indian owner or owners in achieving the
highest and best use of such property .... 29
The Court simply mentioned this section as one of the Secretary of
Interior's comprehensive rules and regulations governing leases of
Indian lands. 30
The section seems almost impregnable until the authority for the
regulation is examined. It then becomes obvious that regulation 1.431
is not evidence of Congressional intent, but of law making by the
Secretary of Interior. The authority for the regulation comes from 25
U.S.C. 2:
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as
the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian
affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations.
The statute appears broad. In practice, though, it has never been used
to justify federal pre-emption of all Indian affairs. For example, in
Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside,32 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a California
possessory interest tax imposed on lessees of Indian land in the Palm
Springs, California area. That court held the tax was "properly
imposed unless it can be said that the legislation dealing with Indians
and Indian lands demonstrates a congressional purpose to forbid the
imposition of it.'33 The Court did not even consider whether such
congressional purpose of exclusion could be found in 25 U.S.C.S. 415,
under which the lease was made.
Even less substance is given the pre-emption argument under
regulations 131 et. seq. 34 of the Secretary of Interior. These regula-
tions are indeed extensive and all-inclusive, governing numerous
conditions precedent to approval of leases by the Secretary of
Interior, accounting of monies and provisions relating to specific
Indian lands. However, not once is subdivision, platting or planning
control mentioned. 35
29. 25 C.F.R. §1.4 (1972).
30. 11 Advance Opinions at 386.
31. 25 C.F.R. §1.4 (1972).
32. 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. Id. at 1186.
34. 25 C.F.R. §131 et seq. (1972).
35. The headings of some of the subsections are indicative of the nature of the entire
subchapter: §131.3, "Grants of leases by owners or their representatives"; §131.4, "Use of land
of minors"; §131.6, "Negotiation of leases." Even subsections which, by heading, sound
applicable to subdivision control are related to other topics, e.g., §131.11, "Conservation and
land use requirement." This subsection reads:
[Vol. 13
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In comparison to the Secretary of Interior's regulations, the New
Mexico Land Subdivision Act 36 requires, inter alia, written disclosure
covering roads, public utilities, water sources, price and financial
terms and the existence of blanket encumbrances. 37 Advertising
standards38 are imposed; legal access to "an existing public way" 39 is
required before land may be sold or leased. 40
The planning and platting authority of the City of Santa Fe and the
zoning authority of counties and municipalities contemplate further
regulations. The rules may cover such subjects as street co-ordination;
open space; population and traffic distribution; street widths; lot
depth, width and natural drainage; grading and improvement of
streets; installation of water, sewer and other utility facilities;41 the
height and size of structures; "location and use of buildings, structures
and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes"; and "the
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of
buildings, structures or land .... -42
No where in the Secretary of Interior's regulations are these
subjects mentioned. The comparison speaks for itself: zoning, platting,
planning and subdivision control are the subjects of state regulation;
conditions precedent for the approval of leases are the substance of
the Secretary of Interior's regulations. It is difficult to find conflict
between the state law and the federal regulations. State law
admittedly may conflict with provisions of the lease between Sangre
de Cristo and the Tesuque Pueblo.43 Such conflict was not used by the
court to justify pre-emption, nor should it be. Even assuming
congressional intent to pre-empt in this field, the Secretary of Interior
has not issued regulations for subdivision development on Indian
lands. Terms of the lease are not a substitute for properly-adopted
administrative regulations. The lease is not readily available to the
Farming and grazing operations conducted under leases granted or approved
under this part shall be conducted in accordance with recognized principles of
good practice and prudent management. Land use stipulations or conservation
plans necessary to define such use shall be incorporated in and made a part of the
lease.
36. N.M. Stat. Ann.§§70-3-1 to -9 (Supp. 1971).
37. Id. at §70-3-4.
38. Id. at §70-3-5.
39. Id. at §70-3-3.
40. The definition of "subdivided land" used in the Land Subdivision Act, id. at §70-3-2,
specifically excludes "subdivisions approved by an agency of the United States .. " Such
language almost seems to indicate that the state has pre-empted itself. However, the language of
this section was not used by the Court in reaching its decision and if the issue had been
discussed, it is, at least, arguable that the legislative intent in including such language was to
exclude the applicability of the Land Subdivision Act whenever adequate provision was made
by the Secretary of Interior for subjects covered by the state law.
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. §14-18-6 (Rep]. 1968).
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. §14-20-1 (Repl. 1968).
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potential sublessee of Indian lands; the consumer has little way of
knowing if the Secretary of Interior has protected his interests. In
addition, the lease in this case does not provide the detailed
regulation provided by New Mexico law.44 Much is simply left to the
discretion of the Secretary of Interior and the Tesuque Pueblo;45
many details are unmentioned. 46 An interesting question arises: if the
lease terms pre-empt, do they pre-empt only those subjects covered
by the lease or any subject relating to subdivision development? Is the
state, the city or the county attempting to regulate a subdivision such
as Colonias de Santa Fe required to litigate every loophole in the
lease terms to determine if pre-emption has occurred.
Warren Trading Post47 clearly illustrates that the legal basis for
pre-emption is federal regulations or federal statutes. Warren in-
volved the validity of an Arizona tax on the income of the operator of
a retail trading post on the Navajo Indian Reservation. The trading
post was operated under a license granted by the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 261. In holding the tax invalid,
the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that the tax would
to a substantial extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose
43. Lease agreement, supra note 14. Paragraph 2 requires that the premises be "developed,
used and operated pursuant to a general plan of development."
Paragraph 8(A) provides that within six months after the effective date of the lease, Sangre de
Cristo must submit a master plan and architect's design for the complete development of Tract
1 to the Secretary of Interior and the Tesuque Pueblo for their approval. Master plans and
architect's designs also are required within six months after the corporation exercises its option
to lease any of the additional tracts.
Paragraph 8(C) requires the lessee to submit to the Secretary of the Pueblo, before beginning
the construction of any improvements worth more than $5,000, comprehensive plans and
specifications for such improvements. The plans shall be approved if they conform to the master
plan and architect's design, but
the Lessor and the Secretary shall not thereby assume any responsibility for
construction or any violation of any applicable laws, ordinances, or governmental
regulations.
Similarly, Paragraph 8(D) requires the corporation to create "a new municipality" which
must, of necessity, provide any and all municipal services normally and usually
provided by municipal corporations. These services shall include, but shall not
necessarily be limited to water service, streets, utilities, schools, parks, police and
fire protection, and any and all other normal and usual municipal services . . . it
being understood that neither the Lessor nor the Secretary shall be in any way
responsible for or obligated to furnish municipal services to the residents of the
leased premises.
The paragraph adds that the corporation shall submit a "complete and detailed plan" for these
municipal services for the approval of the Secretary of the Pueblo.
44. Compare, Lease Agreement provisions cited note 43 supra, with discussion of New
Mexico Statutes p. 541 supra.
45. See Lease Agreement provisions note 43 supra, particularly the provisions for municipal
services and construction at Colonias de Santa Fe.
46. See Lease Agreement provisions note 43 supra. Just as an example of an omission in the
lease, there is no provision for advertising standards and disclosure to prospective subleases.
47. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
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of ensuring that no burden be imposed upon Indian traders for
trading with Indians on reservations except as authorized by Acts
of Congress or by valid regulations promulgated under those
Acts . . . This state tax . . . could . . . disturb and disarrange
the statutory plan Congress set up in order to protect Indians
against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian
Commissioner. 48
The other source for pre-emption the New Mexico Supreme Court
found-the amendments to 25 U.S.C. 415-read, like the regulations of
the Secretary of Interior, as requirements for approval of a lease.
Language requiring or granting authority to the Secretary of Interior
to govern non-Indian communities created subsequent to the leases
simply is non-existent. The 1970 amendment 49 provides that the
Secretary of Interior, before approving leases of Indian land
. . . shall first satisfy that adequate consideration has been given
to the relationship between the use of the leased lands and the use
of neighboring lands; the height, quality, and safety of any
structures or other facilities to be constructed on such lands; the
availability of police and fire protection and other services; the
availability of judicial forums for all criminal and civil causes
arising on the lease lands; and the effect on the environment of the
uses to which the leased lands will be subject. 50
The 1968 amendment to 25 U.S.C. 415 allows the Tesuque Pueblo to
lease its land for 99 years subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Interior and "under such terms and regulations as may be prescribed
by the Secretary of the Interior."51
The holding in the Sangre de Cristo case is limited to pre-emption
of city and county platting, planning or subdivision control over
housing developments on Indian lands, though the language refers to
state jurisdiction. In relying on Section 415, however, the question
must be asked if state courts have been pre-empted, for example, from
opening their doors to a suit arising from a dispute between two
non-Indian sublessees at Colonias de Santa Fe since by the 1970
amendments to 25 U.S.C. 415 the secretary must "satisfy that
adequate consideration has been given . . . [to] the availability of
48. 380 U.S. at 691. It is interesting to note that even in an area well-regulated and
pre-empted by the federal government-trading posts-a suit was brought by the Navajos to
require the Secretary of Interior "to adopt and enforce certain rules and regulations governing
traders doing business on the reservation." Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (1971).
49. The 1970 amendment was added to 25 U.S.C. §415 on June 2, 1970, after the lease was
approved by the Albuquerque area director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in May. Thus, its
applicability to this lease is questionable.
50. 25 U.S.C. §415 (1971).
51. Id.
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judicial forums." The court does not indicate where the line is to be
drawn.
The 1968 amendment also relates to conditions precedent to
approval of leases. This might easily be construed to mean that the
"such terms and regulations" language of the amendment applies to
the conditions established between the lessor-the Indians-and the
lessee-often a corporation-and not to terms between the corporation
and the state. The consequence of the opposite reading is that a
non-Indian corporation taking a leasehold for nearly a century can
have the terms ofits relationship to the state in which it is located and
the people to whom it subleases dictated by the Secretary of
Interior.52 Who protects the interests of the sublessees? The Secretary
of Interior has a fiduciary relationship with the Indians. His task is to
protect their interests. The corporation is presumably most concerned
with its own profit-making. According to the terms of the lease in this
case,neither the Secretary of Interior nor the Tesuque Indians can be
held liable for breach of the contract conditions.5 3 The sublessee must
turn to the corporation for relief if there is a breach, an empty
remedy if the corporation has in the meantime dissolved or gone
bankrupt. In short, the "such terms and regulations" language of the
1968 amendment, if read as an unlimited grant of authority to the
Secretary of Interior, marks a return to the days of a harsh caveat
emptor doctrine. In an age of expanded consumer rights, it is difficult
to believe that Congress intended to leave such sublessees powerless
against the lessee-developer. Rather, a more reasonable explanation
is that the language is simply a grant of authority to the Secretary of
Interior to adequately protect the Indian tribe or pueblo in its
relationship to the corporation in such areas as adequate compensa-
tion, job opportunities, etc., and not to protect the non-Indian
corporation from the force of relevant State law. 54
On the same day that the developers of Colonias de Santa Fe were
successfully arguing that the federal government had pre-empted the
control of subdivision on Indian lands, the federal government was
52. The Secretary does take this atttitude. See, Lease Agreement, supra note 43.
53. Id.
54. One federal statute can be read as evidencing a Congressional intent to preclude state
authority over leased Indian land. 25 U.S.C. §416h provides that:
The Papago Council and the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Community Council, with
the consent of the Secretary of Interior, are hereby authorized, for their
respective reservations, to enact zoning, building, and sanitary regulations
covering the lands on their reservations for which leasing authority is gran-
ted . .. in the absence of State civil and criminal jurisdiction over such
particular lands, and said councils may contract with local municipalities for
assistance in preparing such regulations.
This section also can be interpreted to mean that in the absence of specific Congressional intent
such as that embodied in this provision, state law is deemed to be applicable.
[Vol. 13
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unsuccessful in persuading the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that
the Colonias action was not federal action within the meaning of the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).55
The Tenth Circuit directed the U.S. District Court in Albuquerque to
issue a temporary and permanent injunction preventing the United
States government from enjoining future work at Colonias de Santa
Fe until the NEPA requirement were met. 56 NEPA requires that all
federal agencies make environmental impact statements on "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment ... "57
Thus today, the future of Colonias de Santa Fe remains uncertain.
The land of the Tesuque still sits on the edge of Santa Fe awaiting its
new residents. The problem it has posed awaits, too, for a realistic
solution from the courts or from Congress.
M. A. MATTHEWS
55. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (1972). Appellants in the suit were two landowners living
near Tesuque and two non-profit corporations concerned with environmental protection. They
alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) by failure to make an environmental impact statement
and of 25 U.S.C. §415(a) by approving the lease "without first being assured that certain
statutory mandates had been met."
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). The Court of Appeals first decided that NEPA applies to all
agencies under the authority of Congress and then held that granting leases on Indian lands
constitutes major federal action.
On the National Environmental Policy Act see generally Hanks & Hanks, Environmental
bill of rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 Rutgers L.
Rev. 230 (1970); Note, Panoramic View of the National Environmental Policy Act, 16 How. L.J.
116 (1970); Fraser, Environmental Protection Act 1970, 45 L. Institute J. 393 (1971).
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